Beautiful City is certain to be controversial, as the author's insights and opinions will engage and challenge philosophers, classicists, and political theorists. Download The Routledge Guidebook To Plato S Republic books , Plato, often cited as a founding father of Western philosophy, set out ideas in the 'Republic' regarding the nature of justice, order, and the character of the just individual, that endure into the modern day.
This title introduces the major themes in Plato's great book and acts as a companion for reading the work. Download The Republic Of Plato books , Long regarded as the most accurate rendering of Plato's Republic that has yet been published, this widely acclaimed work is the first strictly literal translation of a timeless classic.
This second edition includes a new introduction by Professor Bloom, whose careful translation and interpretation of The Republic was first published in In addition to the corrected text itself there is also a rich and valuable essay—as well as indexes—which will better enable the reader to approach the heart of Plato's intention. Download Republic books , Plato's most influential work probably written around B.
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Do you think it is a small matter that you are attempting to determine [ e ] and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while? Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also: [ a ] it will be no bad investment for you—any benefit that you bestow on such company as this.
For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitable than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice.
Shall I take the argument and ram it into your head? But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it, or if you shift your ground change openly and don't try to deceive us.
But the art of the shepherd surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are entirely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd's art.
And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, [ e ] alike in political and private rule.
Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulers —willingly hold office and rule? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule?
And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don't answer counter to your real belief. For that is its function. Or if you please to discriminate 'precisely' as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you? Do you call medicine wage-earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages? But if we are to consider it 'precisely' medicine produces health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft?
That was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people's troubles in hand to straighten them out, but everybody expects pay for that, [ a ] because he who is to exercise the art rightly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject.
That is the reason, it seems, why pay must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in form of money or honor or a penalty if they refuse. Don't you know that to be covetous of honor and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach? They do not wish to collect pay openly for their service of rule and be styled hirelings nor to take it by stealth from their office and be called thieves, nor yet for the sake of honor, [ c ] for they are not covetous of honor.
So there must be imposed some compulsion and penalty to constrain them to rule if they are to consent to hold office. That is perhaps why to seek office oneself and not await compulsion is thought disgraceful. But the chief penalty is to be governed by someone worse if a man will not himself hold office and rule.
It is from fear of this, as it appears to me, that the better sort hold office when they do, and then they go to it not in the expectation of enjoyment nor as to a good thing, but as to a necessary evil and because they are unable to turn it over to better men than themselves [ d ] or to their like. For we may venture to say that, if there should be a city of good men only, immunity from office-holding would be as eagerly contended for as office is now, and there it would be made plain that in very truth the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled; so that every man of understanding would rather choose to be benefited by another than to be bothered with benefiting him.
This point then I [ e ] by no means concede to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the superior. But that we will reserve for another occasion. Which now do you choose, Glaucon? But if, as in the preceding discussion, we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry, we shall be ourselves both judges and pleaders. You affirm that perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice that is complete.
You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice? But you probably suppose that I mean those who take purses.
But such things are not worth taking into the account, [ e ] but only what I just described. For if your position were that injustice is profitable yet you conceded it to be vicious and disgraceful as some other disputants do, there would be a chance for an argument on conventional principles.
But, as it is, you obviously are going to affirm that it is honorable and strong and you will attach to it all the other qualities [ a ] that we were assigning to the just, since you don't shrink from putting it in the category of virtue and wisdom. Do you think the just man would want to overreach or exceed another just man? Does he claim to overreach and outdo the just man and the just action?
Then each is such as that to which he is like. Would he not overreach or outdo equally [ b ] the knower and the ignorant? Did you not say that? Don't you remember, Thrasymachus? And yet what more do you want? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. I wish, Thrasymachus, to consider it in some such fashion as this.
A city, you would say, may be unjust and [ b ] try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection. But the point that I am considering is this, whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice.
But please me in one thing more and tell me this: do you think that a city, an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another? Is it not so? Isn't that so? It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an enemy to himself and to the just.
Now that the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action and the unjust incapable of any common action, [ c ] and that if we ever say that any men who are unjust have vigorously combined to put something over, our statement is not altogether true, for they would not have kept their hands from one another if they had been thoroughly unjust, but it is obvious that there was in them some justice which prevented them from wronging at the same time one another too as well as those whom they attacked; and by dint of this they accomplished whatever they did and set out to do injustice only half corrupted by injustice, since utter rascals completely unjust [ d ] are completely incapable of effective action—all this I understand to be the truth, and not what you originally laid down.
But whether it is also true that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier, which is the question we afterwards proposed for examination, is what we now have to consider.
It appears even now that they are, I think, from what has already been said. But all the same we must examine it more carefully. Let us return to the same examples. The eyes we say have a function? Is the case not the same? Could the eyes possibly fulfil their function well [ c ] if they lacked their own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect? For I have not yet come to that question, but am only asking whether whatever operates will not do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its own defect.
The soul, has it a work which you couldn't accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, management, rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work?
Shall we say that too is the function of the soul? But just as gluttons snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first object of our inquiry—what justice is—let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other topic.
So that for me [ c ] the present outcome of the discussion is that I know nothing. For Plato's description of such painstaking Cf. Phaedrus D. Cicero De sen. Eusebius Praep.
For foreign cults at the Peiraeus see Holm, History of Greece , iii. For the metaphorical transmission of the torch of life cf. Plato, Laws , B, Lucretius ii. This is forgotten. Proclus in Tim. The wreath was worn at the sacrifice. Cephalus' friendly urgency to Socrates is in the tone of Laches C. Phaedrus E. Anaximenes imitates and expands the passage, Stobaeus, See my Unity of Plato's Thought , p. Horace, Epistles i. Leaf on Iliad xxii. Symposium B. Milton , Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce , x.
For the application to old age Cf. Sophocles O. Philebus 28 A and Isocrates xv. Theon, Progymn. Ammianus Marcellinus xxv. Schopenhauer often dwelt on the thought, cf. Cicero Cato M. Euripides I. Aristophanes Frogs 82, and on this quality, Laws C. There is then no parody of Antisthenes as Joel fancies. Hense, pp. A fragment of Anaxandrides in Stobaeus Florileg. Thucydides ii.
The Epicureans and sometimes the Stoics unfairly reprobated Plato's appeal here to this motive, which he disregards in his main argument and returns to only in the tenth book. Gorgias A, A.
So often in Plato. Tennyson, Vastness ix. Pindar Nem. This opens the door to casuistry, Xen. De offic. For the argument cf. Apology 22 A-B, Ion A. Williamson, Robert B. John's Review 39, nos.
Designed for courses in the history of philosophy, social and political theory, government, and Plato specifically, Plato's Republic: Critical Essays will enrich students' understanding of this profoundly influential work. The discussions which have been published have been of very unequal value , but the following may be mentioned : P.
Natorp , Platos Ideenlehre , pp. The work also contemplates the duality inherent in life: the reality we perceive through our senses and the truth we can gain through the world of ideas. Skip to content. Treating the Republic as a unity and focusing on the dramatic form as the presentation of the argument, Stanley Rosen challenges earlier analyses of the Republic including the ironic reading of Leo Strauss and his disciples and argues that the key to understanding the dialogue is to grasp the author's intention in composing it, in particular whether Plato believed that the city constructed in the Republic is possible and desirable.
Rosen demonstrates that the fundamental principles underlying the just city are theoretically attractive but that the attempt to enact them in practice leads to conceptual incoherence and political disaster. The Republic, says Rosen, is a vivid illustration of the irreconcilability of philosophy and political practice.
The Republic explores most of the fundamental questions of philosophy, beginning with a search for how to define justice, moving to a quest for a model of the best possible human community, and concluding with reflections on the immortality of the soul. Averroes' book played a major role in both the transmission and the adaptation of the Platonic tradition in the West.
In a closely argued critical introduction, Ralph Lerner addresses several of the most important problems raised by the work. Mayhoew demonstrates that within this criticism Aristotle presents his views on an extremely fundamental issue: the unity of the city and the proper relationship between the individual and the city. Smith presents an original interpretation of the Republic, considering it to be a book about knowledge and education. Over the course of Summoning Knowledge in Plato's Republic, he argues for four main theses.
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